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 EXCHANGE  
 Constitutional scholarship in the United 
States 
 Robert C.  Post * 
 The status and character of constitutional scholarship depends upon the nature of 
constitutional law. In the United States, the content of constitutional law is typically 
negotiated within a dialogue between the Supreme Court and the American people. 
Constitutional scholarship accordingly seeks to mediate this dialogue by clarifying the 
systematic and jurisprudential implications of potential constitutional developments. 
In Europe, constitutional law is more independent of political dialogue; hence 
constitutional scholarship is relatively more autonomous. Whereas European 
constitutional scholars imagine their project as the development of an apolitical and 
internally coherent structure of constitutional norms, American constitutional scholars 
tend to develop theory in the context of its practical implications for case-by-case 
adjudication. 
 I have been asked to comment on Armin von Bogdandy’s excellent and com-
prehensive essay on the profession of constitutional scholarship in Europe. Von 
Bogdandy stresses  “ the fundamental role of legal scholarship ” 1 in the develop-
ment of constitutional law, asserting that  “ [a] thorough understanding of a 
legal order hardly is conceivable without a familiarity with its legal scholar-
ship. ” 2 In Europe, von Bogdandy observes,  “ one can even recognize the iden-
tity of a public law system as grounded in scholarship’s conceptual creations … ” 3 
These are marvelous and strange thoughts to someone reared in the United 
States. 
 Yesterday, for example, in Philadelphia, I visited the National Constitution 
Center (NCC), a museum of the American Constitution created by the 
Constitution Heritage Act of 1988. 4 By statute the functions of the NCC 
include: 
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 1  Armin von Bogdandy,  The past and promise of doctrinal constructivism: A strategy for responding to 
the challenges facing constitutional scholarship in Europe , 7 I NT’L J. C ONST . L. (I • CON) 1, 3 (2009). 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. at 2. 
 4  102 Stat. 1640, Pub. L. 100-433 (September 16, 1988). 
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 (1)  serving as a center of exhibits and related materials on the history 
and contemporary signiﬁ cance of the Constitution; 
 (2)  directing a national program of public education on the Constitution; 
issuing traveling exhibits, commissioning radio and television pro-
grams, furnishing materials for the schools, and providing other edu-
cation services; [and] 
 (3)  functioning as an intellectual center, drawing both academics and 
practitioners to debate and reﬁ ne constitutional issues and, at the 
same time, providing intellectual support for the Center’s exhibits 
and public education program. 
 Americans take their Constitution very seriously, as the NCC attests. The 
museum contains 160,000 square feet of public space and attracted one mil-
lion visitors in its ﬁ rst ﬁ fteen months of operation. It is a lively and entertaining 
institution, full of exhibits that use text, objects, video, and interactive dialogue 
to explain the meaning, origins, and development of the United States 
Constitution. Yet throughout the vast space of these exhibits there is barely a 
whisper regarding constitutional law scholarship. 
 Instead, the focus is on the institution that imagines itself the voice of the 
Constitution — the United States Supreme Court. Visiting the  “ Interactive 
Constitution ” web site maintained by the NCC, for example, the viewer is pre-
sented with three search functions: the ﬁ rst two facilitate topic and keyword 
searches of the book  The Words We Live By: Your Annotated Guide to the 
Constitution by the journalist Linda R. Monk, of whose writing I had been 
blithely unaware before visiting the site, and the last allows the viewer to 
 “ Search the text of the Constitution by Supreme Court decisions. ” 5 Each year 
American legal scholars produce a vast corpus of work commenting on the 
United States Constitution. But for purposes of the NCC and its web site, this 
work is apparently irrelevant. The NCC instead constructs its image of the 
American constitutional order through popular journalism and the case law of 
the Supreme Court. The focus and emphasis of the NCC is not idiosyncratic; it 
accurately reﬂ ects ordinary understandings. 
 From an American perspective, there is considerable tension between 
afﬁ rming that constitutional scholarship is foundational for constitutional 
law and afﬁ rming, as von Bogdandy also seems to do, that  “ national consti-
tutional law enshrines the core of national identity. ” 6 If constitutional law 
indeed expresses national identity, how can constitutional law simultane-
ously be controlled and deﬁ ned by legal scholars? Would any nation will-
ingly yield the contents of its identity to a small group of academic experts? 
 5  Available at  http://72.32.50.200/constitution/ . 
 6  Von Bogdandy writes:  “ If the premise of article 4 (2) of the Treaty on European Union, as amended 
by the Treaty of Lisbon, is correct, then national constitutional law enshrines the core of national 
identity. ” Von Bogdandy,  supra note 1, at 3. 







418 I•CON  July 2009 Vol. 7: 416
Is not national identity, instead, given to a nation by its history and sociol-
ogy, by its citizens, judges, and ofﬁ cials? Certainly that is the message of the 
NCC. Every exhibit in the museum eloquently seeks to portray the construc-
tion of American national identity, and in every instance this portrait focuses 
on the dialogue between federal courts and American political actors. The 
portrait is that of a polity forging its identity through the law of the 
Constitution. 
 This is by no means an eccentric portrait. The United States is a nation of 
immigrants, so that it is frequently said that our very nationhood is uniquely 
bound up in the law of our Constitution. We do not have the equivalent of a 
relatively homogeneous French people who make up the nation of France; we 
do not have the equivalent of the monarchy that embodies sovereignty in the 
United Kingdom. We have always had only a kaleidoscopically changing peo-
ple and their fundamental law, the law of their Constitution. We believe that it 
is the Constitution, not ethnicity, that binds us together. 
 Seen through this lens, the United States Constitution may be law, but it is a 
peculiar kind of law. In the words of Woodrow Wilson:  “ [T]he Constitution of 
the United States is not a mere lawyers ’ document: it is a vehicle of life, and its 
spirit is always the spirit of the age. ” 7 It is an important and fundamental ques-
tion how a  “ vehicle of life ” can exist as law. Ordinary law is given over to the 
control of legal experts and courts. Judicial review, as established in the United 
States in 1803, 8 has since become the chief structural mainstay of our consti-
tutional law. But judicial review has always lived under the onus of the  “ coun-
termajoritarian difﬁ culty, ” the haunting, unanswerable question of how 
unelected judges can purport to speak for the political life and national identity 
of the American people. 9 
 The upshot is that our constitutional law has developed within the push 
and pull of political struggles between the Supreme Court and the American 
people. 10 As Alexander Bickel put it,  “ Virtually all important decisions of the 
Supreme Court are the beginnings of conversations between the Court and the 
people and their representatives. ” 11 Although the Supreme Court may 
announce a constitutional decision, although it may propose a meaning for 
the Constitution, the ultimate substance of the Constitution’s content will be 
signiﬁ cantly shaped by the political forces that the Court’s pronouncement 
 7  W OODROW W ILSON , C ONSTITUTIONAL G OVERNMENT IN THE U NITED S TATES 69 (Columbia Univ. Press 
1908). 
 8  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 9  For a discussion, see Robert C. Post,  Theories of Constitutional Interpretation , 30 R EPRESENTATIONS 13 
(1990). 
 10  For a discussion, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe  Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash , 42 H ARV . C.R. C.L. L. R EV . 373 (2007). 
 11  A LEXANDER M. B ICKEL , T HE S UPREME C OURT AND THE I DEA OF P ROGRESS 91 (Yale Univ. Press 1970). 
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unleashes. This dynamic is evident in cases ranging from  Brown v. Board of 
Education 12 to  Roe v. Wade . 13 In this regard the enormous deference paid by the 
NCC to the Supreme Court as the living and immanent voice of the Constitution 
is more wish than fact. Americans want their Constitution to have the solidity 
of law, but, in a pinch, they prefer their Constitution to express their funda-
mental political identity. 14 
 If this dynamic underlies the creation of American constitutional law, how 
should we conceive the role of constitutional law scholarship in the United 
States? Von Bogdandy writes that in Europe constitutional scholarship pro-
duces  “ an autonomous area of discourse and argumentation, a sort of middle 
level between natural law, which is primarily within the competence of phi-
losophy and theology, and the concrete provisions of positive law, which fall 
within the direct purview of politics and the courts. ” 15 The goal is a  “ quest for 
systematicity through the development of general concepts and structures and 
the perception of these as internal to and operative within the legal system. ” 
Constitutional scholarship is responsible for  “ the creation and safeguarding of 
legal transparency ” 16 and for ensuring that  “ the development of law ” is kept 
 “ in line with changing social relationships, interests, and beliefs. ” 17 
 These formulations display some internal tension. On the one hand, consti-
tutional scholarship is conceived as standing outside the judicial development 
of constitutional law and as disciplining that development through the use of 
systematic jurisprudential concepts and structures. Constitutional scholarship 
 “ systematizes constitutional jurisprudence and, thereby, upholds the original 
doctrinal agenda in times of balancing-happy constitutional courts. ” 18 On the 
other hand, constitutional scholarship participates in the adaptation of consti-
tutional law to modern social conditions by articulating  “ legal principles ” that 
 “ can fulﬁ ll the function of gateways through which the legal order connects to 
the broader public discourse. ” 19 
 12  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  See Reva B. Siegel,  Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassiﬁ cation 
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 H ARV . L. R EV. 1470 (2004). 
 13  410 U.S. 113 (1973).  See Post & Siegel,  supra note 10; Reva B. Siegel,  Constitutional Culture, Social 
Movement Conﬂ ict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA , 94 C AL . L. R EV . 1323 (2006). 
 14  For a discussion, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,  Protecting the Constitution from the People: 
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power , 78 I ND . L. J. 1 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, 
 Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act , 112 Y ALE L. J. 1943 (2003). 
 15  Von Bogdandy,  supra note 1, at 10. 
 16  Id. at 14. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. 
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 On the ﬁ rst conception, legal scholarship seeks to maintain the internal 
integrity of the constitution understood as  “ a lawyers ’ document, ” as an 
expression of the systemic concepts and practices of an autonomous constitu-
tional law. On the second conception, legal scholarship seeks to mediate 
between this autonomous professional enterprise and popular political under-
standings. This mediation swerves constitutional law from the path it would 
take were it to consist solely of autonomous professional expertise. 
 This dual conception of constitutional scholarship nicely captures the 
tension under which American constitutional law actually functions. 
Constitutional law must not only maintain its legitimacy as an autonomous 
professional practice that fulﬁ lls rule-of-law virtues, it must also maintain its 
external legitimacy by remaining responsive to the social needs and demands 
that are placed on the legal system. 20 If constitutional law is torn between these 
twin imperatives, so, too, is constitutional law scholarship. Von Bogdandy 
explains how these potentially inconsistent tasks devolve upon legal scholars 
in Europe. American constitutional scholars are also torn between these two 
tasks. American constitutional law scholars attempt to maintain the internal 
integrity of the law, yet they also seek to reformulate constitutional law so as to 
make it responsive to pressing popular concerns. 21 
 Von Bogdandy remarks that European constitutional scholars stress  “ the sys-
tematic working mode ” 22 and that  “ [a]lthough casuistry, or so-called case law, 
has become more important in Europe, nowhere does legal scholarship operate 
as though a case law – orientation could ever replace a conceptual-doctrinal ori-
entation. One may also formulate this as an ethical argument: fostering and 
maintaining systematic coherence undergirds the ideas of legal certainty, equal-
ity, and, thereby, justice. ” 23 I interpret these passages to mean that in Europe 
constitutional scholars negotiate the tension between systemic coherence and 
social responsiveness by stressing the former. Their primary orientation is 
toward fostering and maintaining systematic coherence. This certainly would 
be consonant with my own observations of European scholarship. 
 In the United States, by contrast, the ongoing, intense, and dynamic 
exchange between judicial decision making and popular mobilization has all 
but foreclosed this option to American academics. When the giants of the legal-
process school sought to bring the Warren Court to heel by criticizing its 
 20  For a discussion, see Robert C. Post & Neil Siegel,  Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral 
Principles, Afﬁ rmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin , 95 C ALIF . L. R EV. 1473 (2007); 
Robert C. Post,  Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution :  Culture, Courts, and Law , 117 H ARV . L. 
R EV. 4 (2003). 
 21  For an example of the latter, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,  Originalism as a Political Practice: 
The Right’s Living Constitutionalism , 75 F ORDHAM L. R EV. 545 (2006). 
 22  Von Bogdandy,  supra note 1, at 15. 
 23  Id. at 16. 
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abstract professional technique and competence, 24 they all but consigned 
themselves to oblivion. 25 Although American scholars may invoke the author-
ity of disinterested expertise, this authority is so thin that the connection 
between constitutional scholarship and mobilizing segments of the American 
public is almost always instantly recognizable. Conservative scholars criticize 
the Court’s failure to follow an  “ originalist ” methodology while progressive 
scholars criticize the Court’s failure adequately to apply the Equal Protection 
Clause to issues of race or gender. 
 Because American constitutional scholars typically seek to translate 
political needs into a systematic and coherent jurisprudential framework, 
their efforts are ordinarily directed toward what von Bogdandy calls the 
gatekeeping function. American scholars seek to ensure that  “ the develop-
ment of the law ” is kept  “ in line with changing social relationships, inter-
ests, and beliefs. ” 26 There is little space for American scholars to address the 
content of constitutional law in ways that transcend the constitutive dia-
logues that ﬂ ow between the Court and its publics. It is quite rare to ﬁ nd an 
American academic who can invoke the authority to speak in a disinter-
ested, disciplining voice about the abstract conceptual structure of American 
constitutional law. 
 The apparent capacity of European scholars to speak with this apolitical 
authority is what underlies von Bogdandy’s discussion of constitutional 
scholarship as having  “ seized the crown, ” meaning that it has become  “ the 
supreme discipline among the ranks of various forms of legal scholarship. ” 27 
The assumption that there is a coherent hierarchy of disciplinary scholar-
ship is manifestly underwritten by the conviction that law is itself arranged 
in a coherent hierarchy. The crown of constitutional scholarship depends 
upon  “ constitutional law’s placement at the pinnacle of the normative 
hierarchy. ” 28 
 No such ordered and hierarchical account of law presently exists in the 
United States, and, consequently, we have no analogously structured hierar-
chy of legal scholarship. The American legal scholars who come closest to the 
European ideal of professional autonomy are those who pursue the discipline 
of law and economics. They have produced a body of work that is highly sys-
tematic, that deploys reproducible methods, and that pursues a scholarly 
agenda that is largely self-determined, although it has a distinctly conservative 
 24  See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr.,  Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices , 73 H ARV . L. R EV . 84 (1959). 
 25  Even the American Bar Association, when it sought to rate judicial candidates based upon 
professional competence, came to grief. 
 26  Von Bogdandy,  supra note 1, at 14. 
 27  Id. at 18. 
 28  Id. at 21. 
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slant. 29 Law and economics has advanced to the point where its practitioners 
can engage in what they regard as  “ normal science. ” 
 Public law scholarship, by contrast, is not characterized by normal science. 
American constitutional scholarship reﬂ ects an indeﬁ nite number of method-
ologies, approaches, and frameworks. There is far more agreement about what 
characterizes excellent work in law and economics than there is about what 
characterizes excellent work in constitutional law. It is for that reason that the 
number of professors practicing law and economics continues to increase 
dramatically. 
 As yet, however, law and economics exerts only minimal inﬂ uence on con-
stitutional scholarship. At bottom, this is because constitutional scholarship is 
primarily driven by the need to ensure that constitutional law remains respon-
sive to changing political conditions. Because law and economics is instead 
driven by its own internally generated telos of efﬁ ciency, it is relatively unre-
sponsive to the evolution of political commitments. The very systematic auton-
omy that makes law and economics a normal form of  “ expertise ” also 
disqualiﬁ es it from an inﬂ uential role in constitutional scholarship. 
 The fundamental contrast between European and American constitutional 
scholarship is reﬂ ected in differences in the institutional location of professors 
of constitutional law. Von Bogdandy writes that  “ [l]egal scholars are members 
of institutions within the system of sciences, dedicating thought, lectures, and 
publications to the systematic exposition of public law, within a professional-
ized scheme and  ‘ unburdened ’ by the need to decide cases. So it comes as no 
surprise that legal scholarship is institutionalized at universities, as faculties 
and not as professional schools. ” 30 American constitutional scholars, by con-
trast, are almost all housed within professional schools. Although  “ most 
Continental constitutional scholars conceive of constitutional scholarship as 
a science, ” 31 few if any American legal scholars, with the possible exception 
of those specializing in law and economics, would conceive of their work as 
 “ science. ” Since the advent of legal realism, American legal scholars have 
understood the study of law to be the study of the social practice of law. They 
have sought to clarify the goals of that practice and to explore how those goals 
can be most effectively achieved. 
 In the United States, the scholars who ﬁ t most closely the model described 
by von Bogdandy are the political scientists who study constitutional law and 
courts. Political scientists are housed in faculties of arts and sciences. They 
imagine that their work is a science, and they seek to explain how the system 
 29  As a discipline, the growth of law and economics was facilitated by conservative groups to counter 
what they believed was a progressive hegemony within legal scholarship.  See S TEVEN M. T ELES , T HE R ISE 
OF THE C ONSERVATIVE L EGAL M OVEMENT : T HE B ATTLE FOR C ONTROL OF THE L AW (Princeton Univ. Press 2008). 
 30  Von Bogdandy,  supra note 1, at 4. 
 31  Id. at 5. 
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of constitutional law actually functions. Most political scientists do not credit 
the law as an autonomous practice; most view it as the continuation of politics 
by other means. 32 
 American legal scholars, by contrast, identify with the practice of law —
 most especially, with the practice of judging — which they seek to clarify and 
improve. Because judging is normative, so is the work of American legal schol-
ars. The profusion of analytic methods and frameworks that beset American 
constitutional scholarship reﬂ ects the normative heterogeneity that pervades 
a vast and plural country. Law is an arena within which this pluralism is nego-
tiated. Were law to ignore this pluralism and to insist upon disciplining it by 
invoking the authority of a disinterested and apolitical legal  “ science, ” law 
could not perform its assigned task of mediating among competing ethical and 
political commitments. 
 The relative autonomy of constitutional law, and hence of constitutional 
law scholarship, is not a natural fact. It is historically and socially constructed 
out of the forms of trust that a society is willing to repose in the claims of inde-
pendent legal expertise. In the United States, tolerance for law as a moderately 
autonomous system is far less than in Europe. This is evident in the process of 
Europeanization, which von Bogdandy discusses. The so-called democratic 
deﬁ cit that attends this fundamental European constitutional transformation 
would be all but inconceivable in the United States. Citizens of Europe are evi-
dently far more willing to entrust their fate to legal experts than are citizens of 
the United States. The contrast between the forms of constitutional scholarship 
that von Bogdandy describes and those that predominate in the United States 
ultimately ﬂ ow from this difference. Because in the United States constitution-
alism is institutionally and normatively entangled with processes of political 
legitimation, so also is the enterprise of constitutional scholarship. 
 32  H ENRY R. G LICK , C OURTS , P OLITICS, AND J USTICE ix (McGraw-Hill1983) ( “ There is a great deal of 
evidence that formal law cannot adequately account for judicial behavior and that social science 
 research provides more complete and realistic explanations ” ); B ARBARA M. Y ARNOLD , P OLITICS AND THE 
C OURTS (1992) (criticizing the  “ law school ” model of judicial decision-making); J EFFREY A. S EGAL & 
H AROLD J. S PAETH , T HE S UPREME C OURT AND THE A TTITUDINAL M ODEL 32 – 64 (1993) (reviewing and 
rejecting variants of the  “ legal model ” of judicial decision making in terms ranging from merely 
unhelpful to  “ fatuous ” and  “ meaningless ” ). 
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